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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND
KEZRETSU: RETHINKING U.S. AND
JAPANESE POLICY
ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on two issues. First, a reexamination of the data on the level of
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Japan suggests that foreign firms sell five to six times more
in Japan than is commonly believed, Previous studies severely underestimated the stock of FDI
in Japan due to poor data. Second, after finding that even after adjusting for various factors the
level of FDI in Japan is still low, the paper explores explanations for this phenomenon. A
second main conclusion is that government tax and financial policy continues to inhibit foreign




Cambridge, MA 02138For twenty-five years, the US and Japanese governments have seen the rise of corporate
groups in Japan, keiretsu, as due in part to foreign pressure to liberalize the Japanese market. In
fact, virtually all works that discuss barriers in a historical context argue that Japanese corporations
acted to insulate themselves from foreign takeovers by privately placing shares with each other.1
The story has proved to be a major boon for the opponents of a neoclassical approach to trade and
investment policy. Proponents of the notion of “Japanese-style Capitalism” in the Japanese
government can argue that they did their part for liberalization and cannot be held responsible for
private sector outcomes. Meanwhile, proponents of results oriented policies (ROPS) can point to
yet another example of how the removal of one btier led to the formation of a second barrier.
While agreeing with the basic conjecture that high levels of corporate ownership may work
to deter takeovers in Japan, the argument presented here suggests that it is not cultural or
institutional factors that produce corporate groups and high levels of stable shareholding, but rather
conventional government policy. The focus on “conventional” policies is important. One does not
need to rely on government encouragement and other non-binding mechanisms of Japanese
industrial policy in order to understand the rise of Japanese corporate groups. The incentives to
form these groups can, to a large degree, be traced to tax, regulatory, and other policies that are
conventional in the sense that their impac~ can readily be understood within a standard neoclassical
economic paradigm.
The failure to recognize the role played by conventional policies in the formation of
Japanese corporate groups has lead to tremendous frustration on both sides of US-Japan
negotiations. The US claims that despite Japanese concessions, very little has changed. The
Japanese, for their part, have grown tired of continual US complaints over sector after sector. To
some extent, this is the result of a failure on both sides to face the facts. On the Japanese side, this
lSee for example, Incarnation (1992), p. 76, Mason (1992), and Lawrence (1993).2
involves recognizing that they have created a financial system through tremendous government
interventions based on dubious economic rationales. But the problem is not only a Japanese one.
As this paper will try to demonstrate, the US position has been influenced by poor data and
insufficient attention to the underlying government incentives to form distinctive Japanese
corporate structures. This has led to a belief that standard principles of economics do not apply in
the case of Japan and that US policy is continually hindered hidden informal regulations.
Considering the willingness of policymakers to believe that trillions of yen worth of
securities changed hands because of government encouragement or a fear of potential foreign
takeovers, it is not surprising that many in the US have decided that process oriented policies are
not tenable and have favored results oriented policies (ROPS).Unfortunately for the proponents of
these policies, it is not just academic economists who think that ROPS are bad economics, most
Japanese do too. The current political climate in Japan strongly favers deregulation. The
implementation of ROPS, however, requires greater governmental intervention which is likely to
further entrench bureaucrats and generate future problems. As the most recent




All of this suggests that we reexamine
conventional policies are not important. The
the evidence in favor of ROPS and the notion
remainder of the paper therefore focuses on
that
two
issues. First, a reexamination of the data suggests that levels of FDI into Japan are not nearly m
out of line with international levels as is widely believed. This conclusion is based on the fact that
much of the data underlying the analysis of FDI into Japan is highly problematic. Second, after
finding that even after adjusting for various factors the level of FDI in Japan is still low, the paper
explores government interventions that may continue to inhibit foreign t~eovers through the
promotion of stable shareholding.3
Data Issues
One of the biggest problems in studying the level of FDI in Japan is that most of the
Japanese data are highly flawed and the US data only give a very imperfect picture of the structure
of foreign firms in Japan. Consider the case of one of the most widely cited pieces of evidence
showing that Japan has inordinately low levels of FDI. In 1988, Julius and Thomsen presented
international evidence on the level of FDI in various countries that showed, among other things,
that while foreign firms in Japan only accounted for 170of Japanese sales, foreign firms’ sales in
the US accounted for 107oof all sales in 1986. The number was so striking that it soon became
widely cited in academic articles [see, for example, Graham and Krugman (1989), p. 25; Graham
and Krugman (1993); Graham and Krugman (1993), p. 16; and Lawrence (1993), p. 85] as well
as at least one popular undergraduate text [Krugman and Obstfeld (1994) p. 162]. With many
prominent economists citing this number, it was only a matter of time before it was influencing
policymakers. Indeed, the first Clinton/Tyson Economic Report of the President (1994p. 216)
justified the US-Japan Framework Talks coverage of direct investment issues by citing the 1%
figure.
The source of the 1%figure is a publication by the Japanese Minist~ of International Trade
and Industry (MITI), entitled Gaishikei Kigyo no Doko (Foreign-Owned Firm Trends). Usually
MITI data are of the highest quality, but unfortunately this is a rare exception. The problem is that
only about half of all firms surveyed actually responded. This 50% response rate probably
overstates the coverage because the survey only covers affiliates that have more than 33% foreign
ownership: far higher than the 10% number reported in the US Survey of Current Business.
Companies like Mazda are not counted as foreign affiliates in the Japanese data although they
would be counted in the US data. Since foreign direct investments are often quite lumpy in the
sense that a single acquisition can move the aggregate numbers substantially, omissions like
Mazda, which is one quarter owned by Ford, can create a very different picture of the level of
foreign presence in a market. For example, due to the Mazda omission, even if the MITI response4
rate for other firms in transportation equipment had been 10070,they only would have reported
around 1/3 of the sales of companies that are more than 10%foreign owned.
Furthermore, the response rate varies year to year and sector by sector making it diffictit to
in~rpret longitudinal and cross-sectional comparisons of the importance of foreign firms in Japan.
The differences in reporting rates are likely to be quite large across sectors. While MITI does not
report response rates by sectors, a similar survey conducted by Toyo Keizai, found that response
rates differed by as much as 10070across sectors, with non-manufacturing reporting significantly
less than manufacturing. All of this suggests that great caution should be used in inferring much
about the distribution of FDI from the MITI numbers.
Many studies have focused on the inflows or levels of foreign capital stocks in Japan as an
alternative to the MITI survey results. Unfortunately, it is not just the MITI numbers that vastly
understate the level of FDI in Japan: the numbers published by the Bank of Japan and the Minist~
of Finance are also inaccurate measures of FDI flows and stocks relative to the FDI numbers
published for the US in the Sumey of Current Business.2 It is worth first noting, however, that
one factor in the MOF numbers tends to make them appear larger than the BOJ numbers. The MOF
statistics are based on foreign firm notifications about future investments, not actual investments.
This means that the numbers will overstate actual investments somewhat because firms that notify
the MOF that they will invest but then cancel their plans will not be counted. Hence in 1992 the
MOF reported that inward FDI was $4.1 billion but the Bank of Japan numbers used in the balance
of payments statistics reported only $2.7 billion of investments. The MOF numbers are not
necessarily larger than the BOJ numbers on a year-to-year basis, however. If a firm notifies in one
year but conduc~ all or part of the investment in the subsequent year, then the MOF will record the
investment in the year of notification but the BOJ will record the investment when it actually
occurred.
The rest of the biases in the MOF and BOJ numbers make estimating of the capital stock of
foreign firms almost impossible. First, the MOF numbers do not count investments of less than
2The analysis of this BOJ and MOF data is drawn from Matsuoka and Rose (1994).5
%30 million and the BOJ leaves out investments of less than Y5 million, Based on the size
breakdown of foreign firms in Japan given by Gaishikei Kigyo Soran [GKS] (General Survey of
Foreign Firms), a source we will examine later, this means that approximately 1/3 of all firms are
left out of the MOF numbers and 10% are left out of the BOJ figures. A bigger problem stems
from the fact that FDI arising from retained earnings, the opening and expanding of branches, and
the purchase of land do not appear in the MOF statistics.s Since the vast majority of the increase in
the FDI stock by US accounting methods occurs because existing foreign firms expand operations,
the difference in accounting in the Japanese numbers serves to lower the Japanese numbers by a
factor of three or four relative to the US numbers. In addition, loans were not counted until 1985
and acquisition of unlisted stocks is not included which further pushes down the numbers.
On top of these distortions, the MOF reports of aggregate FDI stocks are calculated by
summing up nominal dollar investments over time. In other words, if a foreign firm made a $1
million investment in Japan when the exchange rate was Y360/$1then that investment would still
count as $1 million today in tie aggregate stock numbers despite the fact that exchange rate
movements alone should have increased it by a factor of four. In fact, simply adjusting the reported
MOF numbers by a price index, the exchange rate, and the assumption that foreign firms’ capital
stock grew at the same rate as the domestic Japanese capiti stock would increase the reported level
of Japan’s FDI stock from $26 billion in 1992 to over $100 billion. Indeed, this number probably
significantly understates the level of assets under the control of foreign corporations because it
does not include assets purchased by borrowing or by funds supplied by Japanese partners. Given
these considerations and the others mentioned, the stock of FDI in Japan could be as much as 10to
12times higher than the reported levels. This is not to say that it is likely that the numbers are that
high, only that the data are so bad that it is not unreasonable to think that the official numbers are
off by an order of magnitude,
Given these data problems, various authors have tried to use US numbers as an indicator of
the level of FDI in Japan. The numbers from the Bureau of Economic Analysis are clearly superior
3Land does appear in the BOJ numbers.6
to the Japanese numbers, but the problem with using US numbers as a proxy for total FDI is that
the level of FDI in Japan is very imperfectly correlated with the level of US FDI in Japan. US
firms account for 46.5% of all foreign firms operating in Japan, but the distribution of US firms
differs significantly from the distribution of non-US affiliates. Relative to other foreign affiliates,
US firms are more heavily concentrated in manufacturing than in services, but there is enormous
variation across sectors. For example, US firms are underrepresented in banking and in
petrochemicals, where only 14% and 6% of all foreign affiliates are from the US. On the other
hand, and they are vastly overrepresented in sectors like precision instruments and information
services where over 7570 of all foreign affiliates are US firms. This makes it extremely difficult to
draw inferences about the overall level of FDI in a sector from the US distribution.
All of this raises the question of whether it would be possible to obtain a more accurate
estimate of the stock of FDI in Japan. As the previous analysis has suggested, the government data
are so poor that all one can conclude is that the actual level of sales by foreign affiliates or FDI is
probably somewhere between 4 and 12times larger than the reported levels. Fortunately, there are
two private sources of FDI data in Japan that are significantly better than the government sources:
one published by Nihon Keizai Chosakai and the other by Toyo Keizai (GKS). The coverage is
simil~ and we will focus on the latter.
In 1992, Toyo Keizai conducted a survey of 3402 foreign companies in Japan (about 30%
more than the MITI source) and had a response rate of 82%. The data contains a fairly large
number of missing observations, especially for smaller companies, so I built a sample containing
foreign firms in Japan that employed over 99 employees. This yielded 533 firms, but even in this
sample there were 157 firms that did not report sales numbers for 1992.4Using only the firms for
which we had data, the total sales of foreign affiliates stood at Y40.3 trillion or 5.370 of all gross
output in Japan: over five times higher than previously published numbers !5To obtain an estimate
of the sales of the 105 firms for which we had employment but not sales data, I regressed log sales
4Most firms in Japan do not have fiscal years that correspond to calendar years so, in general, the fiscal year that
most overlapped with the calendar year was chosen.
5Fignres do not include construction because no fms reported numbers m Toyo Keizai.7
on log employment and used the estimated coefficients to estimate the sales for the firms that only
had employment data.b Adding in these firms raised the total of foreign sales to +43.0 trillion or
5.6% of all sales. If we assume that the 1243 firms employing 99 or fewer workers have sales
linearly distributed between zero and the sales of the smallest firm in my sample, then this implies
that foreign firms sell 5.7% of all sales in Japan. These numbers still underestimate the true level of
sales because of the 82% response rate to the questionnaire. For example, some large firms like
Nippon ABS or Suzuka Fuji Xerox, with close to 1200 workers apiece, were left out of the
sample. Adding these fms in might raise the number still further.
It is worth remembering that even if foreign firms’ share of the Japanese market stands at 6
percent, it still is lower than that in most other OECD countries by a factor of two or three.
Furthermore, because of historic restrictions on majority-owned affiliates, the stock of majority
owned foreign firms is even more out of line with international averages. However, given that the
stock of FDI is highly correlated with new inflows which, in turn, are largely are a measure of the
expansion of existing firms, it is not surprising that recent Japanese liberalizations have not
brought stocks in line with international averages. Furthermore, considering Japan’s high
corporate tax rate and the high cost of land, labor, utilities, and other non-tradables, it is easy to
come up with a large list of other reasons why multinationals often choose other countries in which
to locate foreign affiliates.
Probably the most controversial reason why foreigners do not invest in Japan has to do
with the difficulty of conducting takeovers in Japan. Mergers and acquisitions constitute one of the
major mechanisms through which US firms enter foreign markets, and the diffictity of conducting
takeovers in Japan has often been argued to be an important factor in understanding why foreign
penetration of Japan still remains lower than in most OECD countries. More specifically, it is often
argued that the large amounts of shares held by Japanese corporate groups act as a major
impediment to FDI. Indeed, there have been an enormous number of anecdotes that have piled up
over the years suggesting that the large number of shares held by Japanese corporate groups, or
6Manufacturing and non-manufacturing Fms were treated separately throughout,8
keiretsu, work to make takeovers exceedingly difficult in Japan. One approach to testing this
hypothesis is to use econometric evidence that controls for various factors and to sw if sectors with
high keiretsu shares have lower levels of FDI. Unfortunately, given the crudeness of the data and
the complexity of the theories, the results are often very difficult to interpret. Furthermore, this
approach leaves open the question of why these shareholding patterns have emerged in particular
sectors. Economists have made great contributions to the Japanese industrial organization literature
arguing that many of these seemingly irrational arrangements may in fact be efficient, but these
discussions are somewhat unsatisfying because the theories have difficulty explaining why there is
so much variation in corporate ownership of securities over time.
The remainder of this paper will ignore most of what has been written on keiretsu in order
to highlight the role played by conventional government interventions. Two caveats are in order.
First, the government regulations presented here are by no means the only ones present or relevant
to catalog all such regulations would result in a book (or books) instead of a paper.7 Instead, I
have tried to highlight the policies I feel are most important to the debate. My focus on the market
for corporate control stems from the fact that corporate takeovers are a major mechanism by which
US firms conduct FDI. Second, my decision to ignore most of the economic and sociological
contributions to the understanding of Japanese corporate groups is not a product of my thinking
that they are unimportant, but rather because I want to focus on the regulatory issues.8
The Ownership Puzzle
During the late 1960’s and early 1970’s Japan substantially liberalized its controls on FDI.
At roughly the same time there was a substantial rise in the corporate ownership. It is therefore not
surprising that these two phenomena were linked by both Japanese and foreign researchers. Just as
7For example, Ito (1992) has one of many books in Japanese on deregulation. His chapter on financial market
deregulation focuses on the regtiation of interest rates, bank deposits, consumer credit, banking hours, and electronic
transfer fees. These are all likely to have very impotit impacts on consumers, but I do not discuss them here
because their impact on corporate ownership is less clear.
‘Readers interested in learning more about sociological and economic approaches should see Gerlach (1992) and Aoki
and Patrick (1994),9
with the 170number, a consensus was achieved that the rise of cross-shareholding in Japan was a
product of FDI. Consider the following passage from Viner (1988) who is representative of a
much wider literature:
In 1971, an amendment to the Securities Exchange Law introduced a system of
notification for t&eover bids and, in 1972, Bendix Corporation made a tender offer
for part of the equity in a small firm (Jidosha Kiki). These evenfi prompted
Japanese corporations to consider measures that would prevent foreign firms from
initiating hostile takeovers of domestic companies. Thus, it was decided that mutual
shareholding, if established on a more widespread basis, could render foreign
takeovers virtually impossible in many cases. With this in mind, hundreds of
corporations (with unofficial Ministry of Finance encouragement) that were not
members of a keiretsu systematically expanded their mutual shareholdings.
Companies within keiretsu increased their mutual shareholding to the legal limit. As
a direct result. ..the percentage of shares held by corporations rose 12.7% [in just
one year, 1971-72].
In terms of the history of thought on Japanese keiretsu, this quote is fascinating because
virtually every verifiable fact mentioned is wrong! First, MOF data reveals that the percentage of
shares held by corporations rose 9.770not 12.7%: an overestimate of31 YO.9 Second, the statement
“companies within keiretsu increased their mutual shareholding to the legal limit” is correct only in
the sense that more than one company was at the legal limit in 1972. In a sample of presidents’
club members constructed using 1972 data from KKS, city banks could have hit their legal limit of
10% ownership 124 times. This actually only occurred in three cases. Although it is difficult to test
the same hypothesis for non-financials, considering that most of them held less than 1YO of the
shares of the other companies in the group, it is highly unlikely that the legal cross-shareholding
limit was binding for many of them either.lo
What about the role of government? It is true that Japan passed its first takeover law in
1971, but as Ramseyer (1987) has argued, takeovers were not illegal before the law, there just
were no rules governing them. The 1971 law simply created rules governing takeovers. Indeed,
one of the reasons for the passage of the law was to make takeovers, especially by foreigners,
more difficult [Adams and Hoshii (1973), p. 190]. In this sense, Viner’s argument is the
9TSE data indiates the increme was even smaller: only 7,6%. See footnote 12 for an explanation of the two data
sources.
1‘The important legal factor limiting ownership for non-financials is that a subsidiary cannot own shares in a
parent.10
equivalent of arguing that monopolies cotid not have existed in the US until the Sherman Antitrust
Act. Furthermore, neither the legal change nor the Bendix bid could possibly have driven most of
the cross-shareholding because they occurred too late. Figure 1 shows the evolution of equity
ownership in Japan. It is clear that much of the increase in financial and non-financial corporate
ownership occurred in the period between 1965 and 1971, long before either the legal change or
the takeover bid.11In fact, ownership by financial, the companies at the core of financial groups,
seems to follow a generally smooth upward trend between 1968 and 1988. Finally, the statement
that the MOF “encouraged’ cross-shareholding suggests that major realignments in the structure of
Japanese capital markets can be achieved through unconventional means. However, as we will
soon see, the main problem with focusing on MOF encouragement is that it obfuscates the fact that
a very real intervention occurred.
One explanation for the rise in cross-shareholding in the late 1960s, often suggested by
other authors, is that the fear of foreign takeovers arising from future liberalization generated the
increase. As Mason (1992) documents, Japanese government and industry leaders placed the
blame for the increase in shareholding squarely on fears of foreign entry following market
liberalization. Unfortunately, for those trying to understand the phenomena, the hypothesis is
difficult to test because it is predicated on the fear of an event that never happened. But here again
the numbers raise serious questions. First, in 1966, corporations already owned over half of all
outstanding shares, which raises the question of why it was that Japanese firms felt vulnerable to
takeovers when corporations owned 55% of their shares but safe at 66%, Certainly it is possible
that the increase in shareholding was due to the increase in holdings by companies who had less
than 5090of their shares in the hands of stable shareholders. However, this raises another puzzle
concerning why it was that before the threat of liberalization, corporate ownership was so high.
Second, it is hard to see how something as trivially small as FDI could drive enormous shifts in
ownership. For most of this time period and even after liberalization, the level of FDI was so low
that had the entire inflow gone towards the purchase of equity, foreign ownership of Japanese
1lTotal corporate shareholding is relatively flat over the earlier period because of the disappearance of investment
trusts and smurities companies as large holders. The reasons for their demise will be discussed later.11
securities would have only increased by a few tenths of a percentage point. As one can see from
Table 1,foreign ownership of Japanese securities increased by only 0.9 percentage points over this
time period. 12It seems unlikely that in response to this modest increase in foreign ownership
Japanese corporations bought up 11% of the market. Indeed, this enormous response is even more
puzzling considering that corporate ownership today is only 5 percentage points higher than was in
1975 even though the share of foreign ownership has doubled.13
It is not just the data that mkes it difficult to believe that the rise in corporate shareholding
in Japan was in response to foreign takeovers. In order to believe that Japanese firms were good
takeover targets one must either believe that Japanese managers were inferior to foreign managers
or that Japanese firms were undervalued. However, considering the fact that between 1965 and
1975 the return on the TSE index was around 100 percentage points higher than the return on the
S&P 500 before factoring in currency adjustments, it is hard to argue that Japanese firms were
systematically badly managed from a shareholder standpoint. Similarly, it also seems doubtful that
the only people who could have appreciated the fact that Japanese stocks were undervalued were
foreigners.
All of this suggests that we dig a little deeper into the data. The following sections explore
the policies that explain why the largest corporate holders of equity in Japan – insurance
companies, banks and non-financial enterprises – decided to invest so heavily in securities.
Insurance Companies
It turns out that the reason for the rise of Japanese insurance industry is easy to locate: the
Japanese tax code. The major tax advantage offered to life insurance companies is that they have
12 The data in Figure 1 is not directly comparable with that in Table 1 because the TSE (the source for figure 1)
does not include shares listed on the over-the-counter market while the MOF numbers do until 1966, Prior to the
creation of the second section of the TSE in 1961, this creates some big differences in the numbers, especially for
non-financial holding. This is why there is a (spurious) slight upward trend in non-financiat holdings in Figure 1
prior to 1961 which does not appear in the numbers shown in Table 1. Figure 1 was based on TSE numbers because
the TSE series start earlier an~ after 1985, are more comprehensive than the MOF numbers.
131nface foreign portfolio investment in Japan exceeds that in the US,12
had a monopoly in tax free individual investment plans. Premiums paid into life insurance policies
or for pension plans administered by life insurance companies are tax deductible up to Y25,000,
50% deductible for the next Y25,000, 25% deductible for the next Y50,000, and then fully taxable
afterwards. Thus, a typical taxpayer has a strong tax incentive to purchase life insurance or pension
policies up to Y1OO,OOO per year to a life insurance pension fund. Similarly, there is an additional
tax incentive that provides a tax deduction of a *15,000 on contributions of Y20,000 for property
and casualty insurance. 14These numbers, however, underestimate the historical importance of the
tax incentives. Inflation has largely eroded the value of this subsidy over the years. For example,
in 1961, a taxpayer that contributed Y60,000 to an insurance type pension plan could deduct one
half of his total payments from his taxable income. Considering that 83% of taxpayers in that year
had incomes of less than Y500,000, these subsidies made insurance an obvious channel for
investment funds.15
Given the absence of IRA’s and most other forms of tax free investments in Japan, the
Japanese tax code made insurance plans the prefemed individual investment vehicle for many
Japanese, and the renowned savers of Japan poured money into them.lG In 1993, approximately
one quarter of all Japanese financial wealth was tied up in insurance policies. Indeed, the value of
life insurance contracts in 1990 was 4.75 times larger than national income. Relative to the rest of
the world, this is an enormous number. For example, in the same year, the next highest country
was Korea at 2.7 times national income, with most of tie west far further behind.17The reason for
the high levels of insurance is that virtually all Japanese policies contain maturity benefits. In fact,
death benefits comprised less than a third of all life insurance payments in 1993. In contrast,
maturity payments and lump sum annuities accounted for 62% of all payments, with payments for
hospitalizations and operations accounting for most of the remainder.
14An Outline of Japane.re Taxes, 1994, p. 53.
15An Outline of Japanese Taxes, 1961, p. 208,
16The bl~ ~xcePtion ~m ~. free po~~ ~avlng~~ccoun~ or ma~uyu whichwereabolished inthelate eighties. We
will turn to the role of postal savings later in the paper,
17ZKTG Hoken p. 76. For reference the numbers for other countries were: US, 2,15; Canada, 2,4; France, 2.2; UK,
1.3; Former West Germany, 1,0.13
Japanese households have therefore chosen to save primarily through two types of
investment vehicles. Either they have invested through insurance companies or they put their
money in bank or postal accounts. While this may help explain why Japanese buy so much
insurance, it doesn’t explain why Japanese insurance companies buy so much equity. For
example, stock holdings only comprised 11.570of US insurance firms’ assets in comparison with
20.3% in Japan. US firms invest very heavily in public and private bonds, but these only
constituted about 10% of Japanese holdings. Much of the remainder of insurance companies’
asseu is comprised of loans and foreign securities. This makes Japanese insurers look quite similar
to banks. In fact, the returns on endowment policies (i.e. policies with a maturity value) offered by
insurers and bank time deposits are quite close in Japan. This contrasts sharply with the West
where the return on deposits is generally substantially higher [Bronte (1982), p. 102].
In order to understand equity holding by insurance companies, we need to examine the
pattern of ownership at the firm level. Table 2 is a matrix showing the pattern of ownership among
presidents’ club members of the Mitsui group in 1993. The presidents of all of these firms attend
regdar meetings which do not involve the planning of collective strategy so much as the sharing of
information. The elements in the table indicate the percentage of shares of the row company owned
by the column company. One of the striking features of this table is that for 15 out of the 25 stock
companies total group ownership stands at less than 2070,and in no case is more than 4090 of the
equity of a company held by the entire group. With typically around 8090of group member equity
held by non-group holders, it is hard to argue that financial keiretsu have “unassailable control over
all outstanding equity.”ls The issue seems not to be why keiret,su hold so many shares, but rather
why it is that banks, insurance companies, and firms, in general, tend to buy and hold on to so
much equity.
A second interesting feature of this table is that despite the common tendency to call Mitsui
a “bank cenkred group” the largest single shareholder is not a bank but a life insurance company.
The Mitsui group is not alone in this respect. In four out of the six largest groups, the largest single
18Encarnation (1992), p. 75, Incarnation is actually referring to the Mitsubishi keiretsu, whose ownership structure
was quite similar to Mitsui.14
shareholder is an insurance company. Not only are insurance companies very large holders of
equity within Japanese financial groups, their holdings are relatively stable. In 1980, for example,
Mitsui Life and Mitsui Fire and Marine (Formerly, Taisho Fire and Marine) held 3.85% and 1.99%
of the presidents’ club member stocks in comparison to 3.7270 and 1.61YO today. This pattern of
“stable shareholding” can be seen in aggregate data as well. Although insurance companies held
17% of all equity in Japan, these firms only accounted for 1% of all sales and purchases [TSE]. By
contrast, foreigners, with less than half the level of equity ownership, executed thirteen times more
sales and purchases. The shareholding patterns of Japanese insurers is closely connected to the
patterns of purchases of insurance in Japan. Table 3 presents the results of a 1993 American
Chamber of Commerce survey of presidents’ club members. The data clearly show that the vast
majority of property and casualty insurance for each of the presidents’ club members was
purchased from the insurance company that had the largest shareholding in the company.
Unfortunately, similar data are not available for the life insurance sector, but discussions with both
Japanese and US members of the industry suggest that it is likely that a similar picture would
emerge if the data were available,
McKenzie (1992) and others have argued that one of the primary functions of this stable
shareholding is to make it more difficult for another company to take over the insurance purchaser.
In other words, Japanese insurance companies do not simply sell insurance; they also sell their
willingness to remove a certain percentage of shares from active trading. The reason why they
offer both products stems from their inability to compete effectively in the insurance market.
Property and casualty insurance, in Japan, is not sold through brokers but rather through case
agents who typically only handle one or two insurance companies’ products. These case agents are
often owned by the companies that purchase the insurance. This means that if management decides
to use a particular insurance company, they can influence the case agent to carry only that insurers’
policies. For automobile insurance these agency commissions typically account for 17.9% of the
total premium cost even for policies sold to repeat customers. 19In the US, 6070 of automobile
19Thedescription of the automobile insumn~ market is taken from Diamond Report15
insurance is sold through non-agency channels like direct marketing or telemarketing which largely
eliminates these middlemen. This largely accounts for the fact that the expense ratio (the share of
the insurance premium that does not cover the actuarial risk cost) is fourteen percentage points
higher in Japan than in the US.
However, it is doubtful that it is simply the absence of sufficiently diligent antitrust
enforcement that m~es this system tenable. Stable shareholding is costly for insurance companies,
and in a free market, there would be an incentive for these insurers to offer cheaper insurance to
companies that did not require the insurer to take out big equity positions. Here, government
regulation plays an important role. In the non-life sector this regulation has largely arisen from the
government’s exemption of the Premium Rating Agency (PRA) from the Anti-Monopoly Law. The
PRA sets uniform rates for motor vehicle, compulsory motor liability, fire, earthquake, and
accident insurance.20 Ostensibly, this agency exists to make sure that price competition does not
drive insurers into bankruptcy, but the net effect is to enforce high prices in the market.
Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance historically has not been very receptive to the
development of new insurance products. Typically the approval process for new insurance
products requires that the developer make public virtually all of the relevant data on the product.
Since this means that companies that do not innovate can enter the market without paying for much
of the research and development, the returns to innovation are largely eliminated. 21This helps
explain why in the automobile insurance sector, there are no differences in policy rates based on
age or driving history.
In life insurance markets, the situation is somewhat different. Here, again, there have been
efforts to set fees above market rates, but firms have been able to offer investors guaranteed
investment contracts (GICS).These contracts offer investors a guaranteed minimum return on their
insurance policies and are one of the major reasons why many Japanese insurers are currently in
deep financial trouble following the recent decline in stock prices. Theoretically, these investment
contracts should be the dimension along which competition should wipe out the rents and therefore
Zocarrol, p. 15.
21Diamond Report.16
the stable shareholding. McKenzie (1992) has argued that competition in insurance is stifled by
extensive sharing of information as well as the tacit cooperation of MOF in an insuranm cartel. The
problem with this argument is that many industries are characterized by extensive information
sharing and are quite competitive. For example, one can easily find out the prices of all computers
sold through catalog stores, but one would hardly consider that sector uncompetitive. Indeed,
considering the homogeneity of life insurance, one should expect it to be very competitive. As for
the ability of MOF to enforce a cartel in insurance, while MOF did restrict entry, it is hard to see
how it could prevent Me insurance firms that had agreed to keep returns low ex ante from obtaining
high returns expost. In general, cheating seems to have plagued other Japanese attempts to form
cartels. For example, Weinstein (1995) examined cartels formed by the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry and found that virtually all of them were failures, Why should insurance be any
different?
Basic cartel theory tells us that in order for a cartel to be sustainable there must be a credible
enforcement mechanism to ensure that those firms that violate cartel prices will not reap a gain. In
all likelihood, none of MOFSregulations are sufficiently rigid or enforceable to maintain a cartel in
insurance. A more reasonable place to look for an enforcer is the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications (MPT) which administers the vast postal insurance fund and postal savings
system. In 1993, the value of funds in the postal insurance plan equaled just over %74trillion:
equal to roughly half of the assets held by Japan’s 27 private sector life insurance firms. This
makes the Japanese post office the world’s largest provider of life insurance, with the biggest
Japanese company, Nippon Life, being less than half as large. In addition, when measured in
deposits, the Japanese post office is also the world’s largest bank. At the end of 1993, the value of
deposits in the Japanese postal savings system stood atY184 trillion which accounts for about a
quarter of all deposits in Japan.
One is tempted to think of the postal savings, insurance, and pension plans as vestige of
Japan’s past development strategy. The system was founded around one hundred years ago during
a time when few banks existed and the government wanted to channel savings into productive17
purposes. However, far from dying a graceful death, the numbers demonstrate that funds under
the administration of the Japanese post office have been growing at a tremendous rate. Most
striking is postal pensions which have increased from a forty year low of Y1.3 billion in 1980 to
over a trillion yen today. Funds in the Japanese postal insurance fund have increased as well: more
than doubling between 1987 and the end of 1993. Finally, the postal savings system has succeeded
in increasing its deposits by ~100 trillion over the last ten years. No one can really justify the postal
savings system on efficiency grounds, and yet it continues to grow.
What is important to recognize about this system is that the rates set by the post office on its
pension and insurmce plans are not determined by the returns on the investments of government
financial institutions. According to Japanese law, the rates set on postal accounts must reflect
current market rates. In effect, the MPT (often in conjunction with the MOF) sets rates by
surveying private sector rates and then choosing a rate that maintains its “competitiveness” in the
market. If private rates are high then postal rates are high and if private rates are low, then postal
rates will be low as well. The MPT is intent on maintaining a certain share of the market, and quite
often the returns to postal accounts are higher than those in the private sector. This eliminates much
of the gain that could be realized by private sector firms in the market. They can compete against
each other, but if one firm’s market share starts to encroach on that of the postal system the postal
rates will move to eliminate the firm’s competitive advantage. By always setting a “competitive
price,” the post office can eliminate the gains from competition, thereby providing a credible
enforcement mechanism to support collusion in Japanese financial markets.
Indeed, the Japanese debate on the privatization of the postal savings system demonstrates
the fact that the postal savings system exerts an anticompetitive influence on banks. There have
been a number of suggestions to break the postal savings system up and create around ten banks.
Regional banks, in particular, have strongly opposed this on the grounds that these new banks
would create fierce competition. But, of course, this fear is only warranted if current rates on
deposits are below competitive levels.18
By keeping rates on deposits low either through stifling competition or by direct regulation
of deposit rates (which remained in force throughout much of the postwar period), the government
increased incentives for funds to be invested through insurance companies. These regulations may
have increased the incentives for stable shareholding by Japanese insurers. In other words, it may
be government policies, not Japanese business practices, that are the problem.
Bank-Firm Links
It is notjust insurance companies who face heavy government interference; Japanese banks
also must compete with the government. The economics of a system in which banks are both large
lenders and shareholders in firms while firms also hold large shares in banks has been analyzed
extensively elsewhere (see for example, Sheard (1994) and Aoki and Patrick [1994]), and hence it
makes little sense to go through all of the arguments about the costs and benefits of this type of
corporate governance structure here. This section will therefore focus on some of regulations and
laws that help support this structure.
A striking feature of Table 2 is that while there is very little cross-ownership of shares
among manufacturing firms, these firms own substantial amounts of shares of the financial firms.
Out of 88 possible cross-shareholds among manufacturers, cross-shareholding only occurred eight
times and most of these shareholds involved less than 1% of the firm’s equity. Adding in non-
financial, non-manufacturing firms raises the ratio of actual cross shareholds relative to total
possible cross-shareholds to 16%: slightly higher but still quite low. In fact, it is quite clear from
the table that virtually all cross ownership of corporations takes the form of financial firms taking
large positions in non-financials and these non-financials taking large positions in the financial.
While a manufacturing firm was one of the top twenty shareholders of another manufacturer only
4% of the time, all manufacturers held shares in all the financial, and manufacturers were the top
twenty shareholders of their group banks in 2890 of the cases. These data suggest that cross-
shareholding is largely a phenomenon among financial or between financial and non-financials.19
While non-financials often hold shares in other non-financials, the amount of reciprocation is
actually quite small.
Once again the tax code plays an important role in these relationships. While the only form
of tax deductible investing open to Japanese households has traditionally been through insurance
policies, a major source of investment funds arises from private corporate pension funds. Private
pension funds are one of the largest single holders of shares in the US but they account for less
than 1090of all sh~eholding in Japan. The prim~ reason for this difference is a 1962 amendment
to the Tax law that created tax advantages for the formation of pension plans [Adams and Hoshii
(1972) p. 110]. Under this amendment, firms were able to create tax free pension plans, funded
either by the employer or the employees, if the money was invested either through insurance
companies or trust banks. This tax law is one of the principle reasons why trust banks were able to
become not only major lenders to fms but also major shareholders.
However, regulation has exerted a fairly important restraint on the ability of these trust
banks to compete. In order to obtain the tax benefits, trust banks and insurance companies that
manage pension funds must invest in very specific types of assets that are determined by the MOF.
Ostensibly the objective of these restrictions is to prevent pension money from being invested in
risky assets, but a subsidiary impact is to impose a fair degree of homogeneity on the portfolio
composition and therefore the return. Investments must follow the 5-3-2 rule: 5070 of the money
must be invested in secured bonds or loans, 30% may be invested in stocks, and 20% in real estate
or real estate trusts [Adams and Hoshii (1972) p. 110]. These restrictions make it difficult for
banks and insurance companies to offer differing returns, and as we have seen before, the lack of
competition in financial product markets often leads to stable shareholding. Indeed in 1980, for
example, the return on large pension funds managed by trust banks varied (after commissions) by
less than 1percentage point [Bronte (1982), p. 238],
The impact of these regulations was probably compounded by taxes on securities
transactions, mandatory minimum fees for brokerage services, a bond underwriting cartel,
restriction of international capital movements, and restrictions on the opening of bank branches.20
These regulations tended to favor debt as a source of outside financing and tended to reinforce
relational banking in Japan.’2zJapan’s prohibition of holding companies following the dissolution
of the prewm zaibatsu probably also enhanced the position of banks within Japanese corporate
groups. Thus, Japanese banks, with both the capital and the absence of restrictions on corporate
shareholding below a certain level, were in a relatively good position to monitor Japanese
corporations. As monitors, it is not surprising that certain Japanese banks took large equity
positions in firms that they sought to monitor and tended to hold onto these positions.
However, it is also important to remember that the same argument explaining stable
shareholding in insurance markets also works in lending markets. A tremendous amount of the
money collected in the postal savings system is pumped back into the economy through loans from
various government institutions, Government banks like the Japan Development Bank and the
Export-Import Bank are well known, but these are only the tip of the iceberg. There are over a
hundred semi-governmental financial institutions operating in Japan [Bronte (1982), p. 149]. In
1991, these public financial institutions accounted for 31% of all lending in Japan [BOJ (1994), p.
250]. Considering that these financial institutions set rates in order to maintain a certain share of the
market, it is not inconceivable that these institutions diminish the incentives of banks to compete
through lower interest rates. While this impact is probably most pronounced in small business
lending and agriculture, industrial lending by public institutions is by no means limited to these
sectors.
Explaining why it is that non-financials are such large holders in financial is more
difficult. Sheard (1994) finds that while non-financials own less than a quarter of all outstanding
equity, about 58% of all of the equity in his sample of 21 banks is held by non-financials. Non-
financial have a particularly large equity stake in the firms that supply them with capital.
Considering that banks make up about 1/6 of all of the equity on Japanese exchanges, this implies
that non-financial ownership of non-financial firm equity is probably around 17%, which is not
very different from average total non-financial ownership in the US. In other words, most of the
22The bond cartel and the restrictions on intemationat capital flows disappeared by the early 1980s. The tax on
securities transactions was redud in 1989.21
relatively higher level of non-financial ownership of equity is due to the main bank system. Sheard
argues that non-financials buy and hold on to bank shares in order to provide a collective
enforcement mechanism that ensures that banks perform their role as monitors. This implies that
the same regulations that created the main bank system may also have increased shareholding by
non-financials as well.
It is also possible that interest rate regulation may play a role here as well. Interest rate
regulations on bank loans created the “compensating balance” system in Japan. In order to
circumvent interest rate restrictions, banks required that firms that received loans deposit a sizable
portion of that loan with the bank. These compensating balances raise the effective interest rates on
loans. It is not inconceivable that in order to get loans in a capital rationed market, some firms also
agreed to become stable shareholders in the banks as well.
Vertical Groups
Just as Japanese financial groups have recently attracted a tremendous amount of attention,
vertical groups, too, have often been the center of trade and investment friction. Ownership by
these non-financials accounts for fully one third of all corporate ownership in Japan. While the rise
of this ownership is often blamed on foreign investment, the development of these groups is also
quite closely linked to conventional policies. Vertical groups are comprised of an assembler who is
surrounded by a large number of smaller suppliers that are technically independent. There is a
fairly large body of literature examining these relationships in terms of their efficiency and social
origins. Once again, we will focus on the government regulations that have helped produce this
system.
In order to understand the government regulations, we need to be clear about what we are
explaining. The most common source used for analyzing these manufacturing groups is the
Dodwell Marketing Consultant’s Industrial Groupings in Japan. With only around 40 groups
listed, that source underestimates the importance of these groups in Japan. Table 4 is drawn from22
Toyo Keizai’s Kigyo Guruupu which contains data on over 1000 manufacturing groups.zq About
half of all related firms in Japan typically appear to be located either in the same industry as the
manufacturer or in distribution. As various authors have noted, these relationships are fairly stable.
Three quarters of the 8,200 related firms for which we have detailed data were in the same
manufacturing group ten years earlier.
Many researchers have questioned how it is that Japanese firms have been able to form
these very stable relationships in which buyers and suppliers continue to deal with each other for
decades. The data suggest that assemblers very often ensure that their suppliers do not take
advantage of long term relationships the old-fashioned way: they own them. One of the striking
features of these groups is the high degree of corporate ownership by the assemblers in the parts
suppliers. Table 5 presents evidence on seventeen such groups of large assemblers. What is most
striking in the table is the degree of ownership held by the lead group firms in the affiliated
companies. It is important to remember that this table simply is expressing average ownership
positions: there are cases where assemblers do not own a large share of their affiliates. For
example, out of the 127 first tier Hitachi affiliates, there are three suppliers that have no shares
owned by Hitachi.LdThese sorts of firms become more frequent when you add in the smaller firms
that supply the affiliates and form the full Hitachi group, but often that is because they are owned
by firms that are largely owned by Hitachi.
The high degree of ownership within these groups raises the question of why Japanese
firms do not simply vertically integrate. There are many efficiency arguments for why a firm might
not want to do this, but let’s ignore them in order to focus on the role of government policy. In
Table 5, we see that slightly over half of all firms in the selected vertical groups were capitalized at
under ~100 million in 1992. Because the selected groups contain some of the l~gest firms in Japan
and large firms tend to have large suppliers, it is likely that for the economy as a whole an even
greater share of vertical group members is comprised of small firms. Table 6 presents evidence on
231t is ironic that Americans refer to these groups by tie Japanese word, “keiretsu,” but Japanese refer to these
groups with the English word “group” (“Guruupu” in Japanese pronunciation).
24First tier suppliers are only those suppliers that have relationships with Hitachi directly. Table 5 also includes
fms that are tilliated with Hitachi’s suppliers,23
the size breakdown of the members of manufacturing groups for a much broader sample of firms.
Unfortunately, capitalization data are difficult to come by for this sample, but data on the number
of employees is readily available.Ls These data suggest that even if we exclude firms with no
employees or those for whom data are unavailable, three quarters of the members of Japanese
vertical groups have less than two hundred employees. This number is probably closer to 84% if
one considers that the firms who do not report data are most likely small.
The size of these firms is relevant when one considers the vast array of policies in place in
Japan to assist small and medium-sized enterprises (SMES). While the definition of what
constitutes an SME varies somewhat by industry and by government program, according to the
Corporate Tax Law, firms that are capitalized at less than ~100 million and report earnings of less
than %8million are SMES.In practice, this last requirement is generally not binding. For example,
according to the Japanese tax agency, the average firm capitalized between Y50million and %100
million had average earnings of +5.6 million yen in 1993, well within the upper bound. These
firms typically report very low average earnings because they are allowed to file “blue returns.”
Filing a blue return enables them to carry forward losses for up to 5 years and cart-ythem back one
year, take special depreciation allowances, and, most importantly, the ability of the government to
audit their books is severely circumscribed. 26In other words, it is probably not too outrageous to
say that in Japan only very poorly managed small firms report profits !27
It is important to remember, however, that firms that can legally be classified as small are
not necessarily small by conventional standards. Because capitalization is a poor measure of firm
size, especially for firms that grow through debt or retained earnings, often quite large suppliers
25Actually, capitalization numbers are available but data analysis would require the entry by hand of over 25,000
capitalization numbers to obtain the sample statistics.
261nprinciple, the books of a fii fding a blue return can only be audited if the authorities catch a calculation error
[See Income Tax Act Seetion 155 A and B and Corporate Tax Law Section 130]. These and other advantages are
discussed in An Outline of Japanese Taxes, p, 127,
2’7Wh11e 53,l~a of w fiis caP1~z~ under ~loo million repofi~a 10ss in1992,only30.570 of larger firms did.
In the category of fms capitized under %1mitlion, a whopping 67% reported a 10SS[National Tax Agency]. All of
the difference is not due to tax evasion, however. Part of the reason why larger firms report losses less frequently
reflects the fact that tie profits of targe fiis are an average of profitable and unprofitable sections.24
can qualify as small firms,zs For example, virtually all of the firms capitalized in the +50-100
million range in the Hitachi group had over 200 employees and one had over a thousand. Because
the government has been slow to adjust the criteria for classifying firms as small, in the 1970s it
was even easier for larger firms to qualify as small firms, For example, in 1970 the capital criterion
for being an SME was the same as it is today, but at that time a firm capitalized between %50
million and +100 million on average and employed 222 workers as opposed to an average of just
over 100 today.zg This implies that older suppliers are more likely to be classified as small firms
than newer ones. Indeed, because of this historical legacy, probably about 70-80% of all group
members are capitalized at under =100 million.
If a firm can be classified as an SME, it is eligible for far more tax breaks and subsidies
than in most other industrialized countries. For example, while the Japanese corporate tax rate for
earnings of over Y8million is 37.570(which is the marginal rate for most large companies), the tax
rate for earnings of Y8million and under is only 2870.q0According to the MOF, this makes the
Japmese corporate tax schedule more progressive than that in UK, France, and Germany.31The
US, however, has significant tax reductions for firms with earnings of less than $75,000, but
consolidated reporting makes it more difficult for a firm to organize iwelf w a collection of smaller
enterprises .32Japanese consolidated reporting of financial statements did not begin until 1977, but
major loopholes allow firms to create dummy corporations in order to evade Japanese taxes.
One of the most important loopholes is the fact that the Japanese Corporate Tax Law does
not distinguish between small enterprises which are wholly owned subsidiaries and those that are
28Since capitiization is the number of shares times the par value of the shares, it has almost no relationship to firm
size for older companies.
29While the capitalization criterion has been the same since at least as far back as 1967, the earnings criterion hw
been steadily raised from Y3 million in 1967 to Y8 million in 1981 [ZKTG, S2, p. 75].
30Neither number includes prefectural, city, or enterprise taxes which tend to increme the differentid.
31ZKTG: Sozei Tokushu (1995, p. 76)
32US law requires consoli~ted ~ rePorting when fires we over 80~0 owned by a p~ent, otier members in a
corporate group, or if the parent has 80% of the voting power (Code Sec. 1504(a)). While this provides a tm
incentive for US firms to spin off 80% owned subsidiaries the m incentives are probably smaller in the US than in
Japan, First, US ties are considerably less progressive than Japanese taxes when one includes state and prefectural
taxes for fms with earnings over $50,000. This tends to decrease the in~ntive to spin off subsidiaries, Second US
law requires that outside investors would have to be part of any subsid@ that was spun off for w purposes. The
requirement that outside investors hold some shares may result in unacceptable relases of information or control that
offset the gains from forming a verticat group.25
not.33This provides firms with an tremendous tax incentive to spin off subsidiaries that are taxed
at much lower rates. In addition, this also may help explain why foreign companies often complain
that Japanese firms buy from their affiliated companies even if the price is not competitive. If the
affiliate is taxed at a lower rate than the parent, it makes sense to try to record as much profit as
possible in the affiliate. Unless the affiliate is so inefficient that the cost of production exceeds the
outside price by more than the tax subsidy, assemblers should rely on their affiliates even if the
outside price is lower.
In addition to these tax measures, there are at least twenty other laws that create a variety of
other benefits for SME’s. For example, SME’s borrowed approximately +30 trillion in low interest
loans in 1994 from the Small Business Finance Corporation, the People’s Finance Corporation,
and the Central Bank for Commercial and Industrial Cooperatives.34 In fact, lending by these
government institutions accounted for approximately 10% of all lending to SME’s. This, of
course, does not include loans from other public financial institutions, worker training subsidies,
subsidies for technological development, and various measures for “structural adjustment
assistance.”
The second major loophole is that subsidiaries are allowed to have different taxable years
than their parents.gs This is true even for firms that do not qualify as SME’s. For example, while
none of Toyota’s first tier suppliers would qualify as SME’s, only one of these suppliers closed its
books on the same date as Toyota did in 1994. Even subsidiaries that were 100% owned by
Toyota closed their books on different dates. Allowing subsidiaries to close their books on
different days from their parents permits firms to manipulate tax payment schedules in order to
reduce their tax burden. For example, an assembler might pay off its suppliers prior to closing the
books in order to reduce its profits and therefore its tax liability. If the supplier then incurred the
33This is not true of all other laws. Some laws require small fu-msto have fewer than a certain number of workers
(usually 300), not more than one half of their capital from a large firm, and/or not more than one half of their
directors from a large fm, These laws are surnman“zealin Chusho Kigyo-cho (1994).
34BudgetBureau.
351am grateful to Gary Saxonhouse for suggesting that I explore this possibility.26
costs of producing and delivering the parts before its books closed, the group can succeed in
delaying its tax payment.
Tax incentives not to vertically integrate are an even stronger incentive in distribution. In
addition to the disincentives to open large stores in Japan generated by the Large Scale Retail Law,
Japanese tax law grants large advantages to small retailers and wholesalers.qb Consider the direct
tax benefits: first, all of their tax burden is reduced from 37.5% to 28%, and second, small stores
do not need to charge the 3% consumption tax. If firms’ income stands at around 10% of sales,
then these two measures mean that small retailers in Japan have a 4 percentage point price
advantage over their larger counterpm before one even begins to count all the other subsidies and
policies available to them as SME’S.The existence of these tax incentives suggests that small stores
may remain a feature of Japanese retail regardless of the future of the Large Scale Retail Law.
It is important not to conclude from these examples that the tax code is the only reason for
vertical groups in Japan. Japan’s ban on holding companies probably plays an important role in
favoring vertical groups relative to conglomerates. Obviously, there are many other reasons why
firms choose not to vertically integrate in both Japan and the US, and there area lot of members of
corporate groups for whom these benefi~ do not apply. For example, virtually all members of the
Nissan and Isuzu groups are large firms with the same closing date as their parents. However, in
both groups the affiliate with the largest number of employees closes its books on a different date
than its parent. Defenders of the tax code would argue that these large affiliates, Unisia Jets (in the
case of Nissan) and Zexel (in the case of Isuzu), are independent companies, but the fact that they
are 30 and 20 per cent owned by their respective buyer firms makes this independence less clear.
Furthermore, newly created affiliates are required to have the same closing date as their
parents. In other words, while these policies for SME’s historically may have greatly contributed
to the formation of vertical groups, their importance for the future is beginning to wane. In fact, the
rate of creation of new affiliates has fallen sharply over the last decade, but it is difficult to tell how
36 TheLargeScaleRetailLaw is essentially a zoning restriction that has made it more difficult for large stores to
open up new branches, Recent reforms to the law following the Structural Impediment Initiative have reduced these
restrictions to some degree,2’7
much of this is due to the recent economic downturn and how much is due to the reduction in
incentives to form these organizations.
Reexamining the Link between FDI and Cross-Shareholding
The discussion, so far, helps to identify how conventional government policies helped
shape the structure of corporate ownership in Japan. Tax policies favored certain financial
institutions and industrial structures. When this was combined with regulations that limited or
eliminated certain types of price competition, Japanese economic agents circumvented these
regulations through distinctive forms of shareholding. While these arguments work well to explain
levels and trends, they do not explain the shifts in trends that occur roughly between 1965 and
1973. Since it was these movements that motivated the initial argument in favor of a link between
FDI and cross-shareholding, it is important that we examine this period in greater detail.
The story begins in 1963 when, following a rapid rise in stock prices, there was a crmh in
the Japanese m~ket.qT Between April and December of 1963 the average share price on the first
section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange fell by 27%. Many firms and individuals lost money, which
prompted the MOF and the Bank of Japan to decide that it was necessary to prop up the market.
Early in 1964, the Japanese government formed a public/private venture called the Japan Joint
Securities Corporation (Nihon Kyodo Shoken Kabushiki Gaisha) which had the mission to put a
floor on the Japanese market by buying up securities whose prices were “too low.” Initially, this
firm was financed by private sector banks and low interest loans from the Bank of Japan although
as time went on and the firm needed more capital, insurance companies were asked to participate as
well.
371am indebted in part to Paul Sheard for suggesting that I explore this direction. Much of the materi~ for the
discussion of the stock market bailout was drawn from Sheard. 1986,28
The Joint Securities Corporation began purchasing securities at a tremendous rate. In its
first year of operation, it purchased 1.6billion shares at a cost of 190billion yen.3gThis accounted
for 2% of all shares and 3% of the entire value of the market. Very quickly, however, it became
apparent that this was not sufficient to put a floor on the market. In 1965, Yamaichi securities as
well as the smaller Oi (now Wake) securities failed. A l~ge number of other securities companies
were also in trouble because, like Yamaichi and Oi, they had used the equity in their trust accounts
as collateral to borrow heavily from banks in order to finance the purchase of more stocks. With
the slump in stock prices, these firms were no longer solvent [Adams and Hoshii, p. 171]. In
order to stave off a new rash of bankruptcies, the BOJ extended ~28 billion in low interest loans to
Yamaichi and another +5.3 billion to Oi via city banks. In addition, a second semi-governmental
institution, the Japan Securities Holding Association (Nihon Shoken Hoyu Kumiai), was formed
to prop up share prices further. By July of that year this association had purchased an additional
%230billion in equities from investment trusts and securities companies.
In the end these two institutions purchased 5.2% of all shares listed on the TSE and the
BOJ estimates that the overall cost of the intervention was close to Y500 billion. However, since
the Japan Joint Securities company was restricted to only purchasing equity from the first section
of the exchange, where most core corporate group firms are listed, ownership of the first section
was probably closer to 690 [Adams and Hoshii (1972) p. 199]. The government also created
various less visible incentives for firms to buy up securities through the extension of loans from
the BOJ to banks. For example, between 1964 and 1970 the value of new shares purchased by
Japanese banks increased by approximately the same amount as the increase in money lent to them
by the BOJ.
Purchasing 670 of the market had the desired effect on stock prices, but now the semi-
governmental institutions faced the problem of what they were going to do with the shar= they had
purchased. The express objective of the government was to transfer the shares into “stable” holders
[Adams and Hoshii p. 199] which meant that these shares would be transferred directly to
38Ntion Kyodo Shoken =dan (1978).29
corporations that would not sell them in the short term. Indeed, 90% of the shares held by the
Japan Securities Holding Association and 75% of the shares held by the Japan Securities Holding
Association were sold to corporations during the next five years [Moriki (1988) p. 395]. The sales
of these securities probably account for a large portion of the faster increase in non-financial
corporate ownership over the late 1960’s. In other words, Japanese banks and firms bought more
shares because the government subsidized their purchase through low interest lending.
This intervention is probably more important than other legal changes over the period. For
example, Mason (1992) argues that one reason for the continued rise in non-financial corporate
ownership between 1966 and 1973 was changes in the laws covering private placement of
securities. Private placements are private sales of equity, often at very low prices, to selected
persons or firms such as directors, employees, suppliers, or distributors.3g These transfers are
often made to corporate shareholders who are unlikely to sell in response to a takeover bid.
Alternatively, they can also be seen as a payment mechanism. In 1966, Mason argues, the
Japanese commercial code was changed in order to make these transactions easier.40 In order to
block a third-party allocation that was proposed by management, two thirds of the existing
shareholders would have to vote against it.ol Ostensibly the reason given by the firms was to
reduce the chance of foreign takeovers, but in practice these sales may have enriched the recipients
of the stock and enabled management to become further entrenched. Following a rapid increase in
these private placements in the early 1970’s, the securities industry finally clamped down on
private placement transactions in 1973.42
This story while initially sounding compelling, probably only explains a small part of the
increase in cross-shareholding for several reasons. First, many of the private placements that
occurred in the 1950’s and 1960’s were made by companies whose stock was not trading publicly.
In many of these cases, existing shareholders had preemptive rights which meant that they had the
39Japan Securities Market Research Institute (1994),
40Mason (1992), p, 205,
41Adams and Hoshii (1972) p. 193.
42Japan Securities Market Research Institute (1994).30
option to stock issued to third parties at the same price.43In addition, since a below market value
issuance of stock to a third party would violate the board’s duty of loyalty to the shareholders,
whether the board approved the sale or not, existing shareholders could block an issuance that
harmed them. This makes it unlikely that many issuances were made at prices that were below the
true value of the stocks. It is not just legal issues that would have made it difficult for Japanese
managers to use private placements to sidestep existing shareholders. The data also does not seem
to support this hypothesis. Figure 2 shows the value of private placements relative to equity
outstanding as well as the value of the placement over the par value of the stock relative to the
amount of money raised by the placement. Since par values are typically substantially below
market values, this last measure gives some indication of the discount of the shares. A few things
are apparent from the graph. First, while private placements were made at significant discounts
prior to 1972, in later years they were conducted at prices that were substantially above the par
value of the stocks. Second, despite the legal change, private placements did not increase much
between 1966 and 1973 relative to the total market. Third, although there was a surge in private
placemen~ in 1971 and 1972, the magnitude of these placements was minute relative to the size of
the market. Even if we assume that these shares were released at half their market value and that all
private placements went to corporations (both of which are generous assumptions), then these
issues still could only account for no more than 5-10% of the increase corporate shareholding in
the first two years of the decade and even less overall.
The most plausible explanation for the rise in 1972 probably has nothing to do with
government policy at all. 1972 was the year in which the TSE posted its single largest percentage
gain over the last 30 years. With stock prices at a record high, 498 firms, close to 1/3 of all listed
firms, issued equity at a total value of over one trillion yen. This constituted a 4% increase in the
value of the TSE: another 30 year record. Out of the approximately 500 share issuances in that
year, however, only 43 were private placements. The vast majority of issuances in both value and
number were public offerings or offers to existing shareholders. Since the majority of the shares
431 am grateful to Mark Ramseyer for clarifying the legal issues related to this fwst point for me, Technically,
existing shareholders were limited to purchasing up to their percentage interest in the new company.issued in 1972 were offered to the public, in most cases foreigners or any existing shareholders
could have just as easily purchased the shares as particular Japanese firms. The notion that cross-
shareholding grew in these years through quiet side deals does not seem to be born out by the data.
On the contrary, the Japanese government played an important and active role in the formation of
corporate groups through
Conclusion: Towards
conventional policies that subsidized their formation.
a Process Oriented Policy
One is tempted in this type of analysis to draw comparisons with the US and argue that the
difference between the two systems is due to Japanese regulation. It is often taken for granted that
the US system of diversified ownership of corporations is the “deregulated” benchmark against
which other countries should be judged. Indeed, many a proponent of the Japanese keiret,susystem
has run up against the economists’ retort, “ if Japanese corporate groups are so good, why don’t
we see them develop in the US?” The answer, it turns out, has to do largely with US securities
market regulations that have the opposite effwt of Japanese regulations: US laws tend to force high
levels of diversification by large US financial institutions.
Table 7 [drawn from Roe (1990)] presents the major restrictions on portfolio choices by
US financial enterprises. Very little comment is needed. The reason why financial firms do not take
out large positions in individual firms and try to actively manage them is that in most cases it would
be illegal or tax disadvantaged. Furthermore, joint actions by financial that would involve pooling
their shareholdings are also difficult to accomplish due to other regulations.44 In light of these
restrictions, it is entirely possible that high levels of equity holdings by a single financial entity, as
often happens in Japan, may be more the result of free market factors than the atomistic holdings
more common in the US. In other words, maybe the problem is not that Japanese regulations make
takeovers too difficult, but that US regulations make them too easy!
44These are discussed in greater detail in Roe (1990), The problematic regulations covering group action include
filing papers ahead of time regarding the intentions of the joint action, restrictions on communications within the
group, and restrictions on short term sales by group members.32
There is little doubt that Japan is not going to privatize the post office or eliminate tax perks
for various financial institutions and small businesses overnight. However, it is also important to
recognize that there is increasing pressure within Japan to make these changes. Often foreign
pressure, gaiatsu, can be helpful for the proponen~ of economic liberalization especially when
these liberalizations play one political group or ministry off against another. It is along these fault
lines – areas where politically powerful constituencies hold opposing views – that US policy is
likely to be most effective.
Consider the potential for pressure on Japanese corporate tax rates. Currently, in Japan it is
not only foreign firms that would prefer lower corporate tax rates, the leading enterprise
organization, Keidanren, has also been engaged in an ongoing battle to lower Japanese corporate
tax rates. Japanese firms feel that high corporate taxes hurt them relative to foreign competitors.
These forces have successfully reduced the maximum corporate tax from 42% in 1981 to 37.5%
today. The lowest tax bracket has only fallen from 3070to 2870over the same time period. If Japan
were to further lower the tax rate for large corporations, that would tend to increase FDI, reduce
Japan’s trade surplus, stimulate investment, and diminish the incentives for vertical groups. Not
bad for a simple process oriented policy.
Pressuring for deregulation in insurance is another potentially high impact area.
Considering the vast array of regulations in the US market, this would have to be a bilateral
negotiation at the very least, but there certainly is strong support within Japan for deregulation
here, too. In the framework talks progress wm made on easing the acceptance of new insurance
products, reducing insurance rate regulations, and the introduction of insurance brokers, but
clearly this is an area where more could be done. For example, the innovative Japanese insurance
companies, banks and the MOF are not happy with the “competition” offered by the MPT and
other government institutions. Once again this provides a potential area for mutual gain.
Deregulation of investment vehicles is a further area that might work to improve Japanese
efficiency and diminish the importance of corporate groups. The MOF restrictions on the types of
funds that can manage tax-free investments and the portfolios of these firms swm unnecessary.33
The argument that without MOF guidance, firms will invest in risky assets seem hollow in light of
MOF regulations that required that firms invest in the now depressed real estate sector.
Deregulation in this area is likely to have wide ranging impacts on the structure of corporate
ownership in Japan.
This list of potential process oriented policies is only a small sample of those that are likely
to have profound effec~ on the structure of Japanese industrial organization. The US has a clear
interest in Japanese efforts to deregulate their financial markets, It is a shame that the US ends up
talking about numerical targets instead.34
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Mitsui Group Insurance Business (1991)
Core Company Case Agents Insurance Estimated % of





Sakura Bank Yowa Mitsui M&F 25 1.1
Nippon F&M 75
Others
Horai Mitsui M&F unknown
Other 18
corns.




Mifiui Trust Sanshin Shinko Mitsui M&F 90 1.7
Banking Others 10
MitsuiLife Ins. Onyu Mitsui M&F 100







MiWuiMining Co. Sanko Shoji Mitsui M&F 100 2.1
MitsuiConstruction Sanken Shoji Mitsui M&F 100 1.2 n Lo.
SankiEngineering Sanshin Sangyo Mitsui M&F 100 1.7
co.
NipponFlour Mills Suehiro Kogyo MiwuiM&F 100 5.2
:0.





2ji Paper Co. Oji Fudosan Mitsui M&F Unknown
Others
Kyoei Shokai Mitsui M&F 45
(general agt) Other 21 co.’s 55
Uifiui Toatsu Santo Sangyo MiWuiM&F 100 2.3
~hemicals
UitsuiPetrochemical Sun Business MiwuiM&F Top share 2.2
rids., Ltd. OthersTable 3 (Continued)
Onoda Cement Co. Onoda Fudosan Mitsui M&F 90 2.2
Others 10
Azuma Kogyo Mitsui M&F 90
Others 10
The Japan Steel Fuji Shokai (general MiEui M&F 1.9
Works, Ltd. agt) Sumitomo ::
F&M
Others
Mitsui Mining& Mitsui M&S staff Mitsui M&F 100 0.9
Smelting Co. service




Mitsui Engineering Sanko Zitsugyo MiwuiM&F 2.2
& Shipbuilding Others ;:
Toyota Motor Corp. ToyOtaTsusho Mitsui M&F Top Share 2.5
Others
Mitsukoshi, Ltd. Sanbi Mitsui M&F 50 0.8
Other 10 50
corns.
Mitsui Real Btate Mitsui R.E.D. Sales Mitsui M&F Top Share 1!7
Development Co. Others
Mitsui O.S.K. Shosenmitsui Kosan Mitsui M&F 3.0
Lines, Ltd Sumitomo :: 3.1
M&F
Mitsui Warehouse Tokyo Sanshin Mitsui M&F 95 5.9





Dowa F&M once belonged to Taiyo-Kobe Bank Group, now merged into Sakura Bank, which
holds 4.99% of the shares of Dowa F&M.
Sakura’sthree case agents handle their pre-merged bank’s business, Yowa for Taiyo Bank,
Horai for Mitsui Bank, and Keihanshin Hoken Daiko for Kobe Bank.Table 5








































































































Source:KKS(1984)andKG(1994) *Data is for 1992
Table 6
Size Breakdown of Japanese Subsidiaries
Industry Number of Number of Total Percentage of Employees by Firm Size
Workers m Workers in Number Oor
Parent Co. Subs. of Subs. Un- <30 30-39 40-49 50-99 10(-199 200-499 500-999 1000+
known
All Industries 6,279,200 3,976,700 25293 13 33 6 5 15 12 10 4 3
Manufacturing 3,129,000 1,914,500 8224 11 21 6 5 17 16 14 5 4
Nonmanufachuing 3,150,200 2,062,200 17069 14 39 6 5 13 10 8 3 2
Source:NKG(1995)Table 7
Important Ownership Restrictions for US Financial Institutions
Assets in
hstitution Trillions Restriction Source
(1989)
Banks $3.2 Stock Ownership Prohibited Glass-Steagall Bank Act
Bank Holding $0,3 No More than 5% of the voting stock Bank Holding Act of 1956
~ompanies of any nonbank
BankTrust $0.7 No more than 10% of assets in any Comptroller Regtiations
~unds (1988) one company
Active bank control could trigger Bankruptcy case law
bank liability to controlled company
.ife Insurers $1,3 No more than 2% of assets can be NY Insurance Law (for
placed in a single company insurers doing business in
NY)
No more than 20% of assets can be NY Insurance Law
held in stock
‘roperty and $0.5 None Same
:asualty
3pen End $0.5 For Half of Portfolio: No more than hvestrnent Company Act
tiutual Funds 5% of fund assets can be invested of 1940: Subchapter M of
into stock of any issuer and fund the Internal Revenue Code
may not purchase more than 10% of
the stock of any company. For other
half: No more than 25% of fi.mds
assets can be placed in a single stock.
Otherwise tax penalties apply.
Must get SEC approval prior to joint Same
action with affiliate, i.e., a fund
needs SEC approval before acting
jointly to control a company of which
it and its partner own more than 5%
Pensions $1.2 Must diversify unless clearly sensible Employment Retirement
not to Income Security Act of
1974
Source: Roe (1990)